

The council's restrictive measures of 15 June 2026 against Russia

New listings targeting the military-industrial complex, the shadow-fleet ecosystem, hybrid activities and human rights violations

15 June 2026

On 15 June 2026, the Council of the EU Council) adopted a further set of restrictive measures in response to what it terms the Russian Federation's (Russia's) war of aggression against Ukraine. The measures add 34 individuals and 47 entities to the EU's asset-freeze and travel-ban lists across three sanctions regimes, and they renew, on the Council's annual review, the measures responding to the annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. This is not a new numbered sanctions package but a batch of fresh designations; the broader twenty-first package is still to come.¹

Background

The measures form part of the EU's now-extensive framework of restrictive measures against Russia, which combines sectoral economic sanctions with individual and entity designations. Today's listings fall under three distinct regimes, each with its own legal basis: the territorial-integrity regime (Regulation (EU) No 269/2014), which carries the core asset-freeze and travel-ban designations; the destabilising-activities regime (Regulation (EU) 2024/2642) and the situation-in-Russia regime (Regulation (EU) 2024/1485). All three work in the same basic way: they freeze the funds and economic resources that a listed person owns or controls, prohibit anyone from making funds or economic resources available to that person, and, for listed individuals, impose a ban on entry into or transit through the territory of the member states.²

The designations announced today take the cumulative total of persons and entities listed in response to the war to well over 2,600, and they follow the 20th package adopted on 23 April 2026, the most recent of the numbered economic packages. What matters about the present action is less its scale than its composition: instead of amending the sectoral prohibitions, it widens the designation lists across the four components the Council has identified as priorities and it reaches enablers established well beyond Russia. The analysis that follows takes each component in turn before turning to the cross-border reach that, for most operators, is the salient feature.

The designations

The first component targets the Russian military-industrial complex. The Council has listed seven individuals and 21 entities that it describes as supporting Russia's military and industrial complex, and its enablers in third countries, among them manufacturers and suppliers of unmanned aerial systems and other military equipment, together with two bodies set up by the Russian government to develop advanced unmanned systems for military purposes. What stands out about this component is how openly it reaches suppliers based outside Russia: the listings take in companies established in China, including a lubricant-additive manufacturer, in line with the Council's stated aim of squeezing the complex by designating the third-country undertakings that feed it. For operators, the immediate consequence is that dealings with the newly listed entities, and with entities owned or controlled by them, are now prohibited for EU persons and within the EU.³

1 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1364 of 15 June 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1361 of 15 June 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, both concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; *vid.*, Council of the EU, [Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine: New EU Sanctions Target Energy Revenues, the Military-Industrial Complex, Propaganda and Human Rights Violations](#) (Press Release, 15 June 2026).

2 Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 and Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014; Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642; Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1484 of 27 May 2024 and Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1485.

3 *Vid.*, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1361, *supra* n. 1.

The second component is directed at Russia's energy revenues, but its designations fall overwhelmingly on the maritime-service providers that keep the shadow fleet at sea, rather than on the oil trade itself. Of the two individuals and 24 entities listed, the substantial majority are ship-management companies, described in the listing reasons as specialising in technical support and acting as the technical or Institute for Supply Management (ISM) managers of named tankers, alongside several bunkering operators and a maritime insurance broker; only a small number are vessel operators or oil-trading entities, and a single producer-side company appears. The Council's stated objection is not that these undertakings own the cargo, but that they service vessels that lack adequate liability insurance, and engage in ship-to-ship transfers and the manipulation of Automatic Identification Systems while carrying crude oil or petroleum products exported from Russia. The companies are established across Russia, Liberia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Hong Kong, and the listings build on the EU's separate vessel-designation regime, under which several hundred tankers already face a port-access ban and a bar on the provision of maritime services. For ship managers, bunker suppliers, insurers and the operators that rely on them, the practical effect is that the pool of maritime counterparties needing to be screened has widened again, and that any exposure to the listed companies now triggers the asset-freeze and the prohibition on making funds available.⁴

The third component targets what the Council describes as Russia's hybrid activities and its spreading of state propaganda. Acting under the destabilising-activities regime, the Council has listed 10 individuals and one entity, among them persons it describes as engaged in foreign information manipulation and interference, and as responsible for disinformation meant to justify or legitimise the war of aggression. Those designated include a state-controlled newspaper editor, a social-media influencer, a clergyman said to play an active part in propaganda and a cultural foundation created by a Russian presidential decree. The component matters less for its commercial reach, which is limited, than for the way it continues to build out the foreign-information-manipulation framework as a sanctions instrument in its own right, working in parallel with the territorial-integrity regime.⁵

The fourth component acts under the situation-in-Russia regime and addresses serious human rights violations, among them the persecution, poisoning and death of Alexei Navalny. Following the joint statement of the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands of 16 February 2026, the Council has listed one entity and 15 individuals for their involvement in those events, among them judges, prosecutors and law-enforcement, as well as state-security and medical personnel. It has also listed a company said to have helped develop a facial-recognition system used to track and detain independent journalists and peaceful protesters.

This component rests on the clearest human rights rationale of the four, reflecting the Council's stated concern with the systematic repression of civil society in Russia, and with the country's repeated disregard for the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁶

Separately from the new listings, the Council also completed its annual review of the measures responding to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, extending them until 23 June 2027.⁷

Cross-border reach and compliance implications

The aspect of the package most likely to affect operators outside the EU is its reach into third-country supply chains and maritime networks. Across the military-industrial and shadow-fleet components, the Council has listed entities established in China, Liberia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Hong Kong, continuing the EU's practice of designating the non-Russian undertakings it believes are being used to circumvent its sanctions. An EU asset-freeze designation does not, in itself, carry the secondary-sanctions effect that marks certain US measures; its direct legal reach runs to EU persons and to conduct within the EU. Even so, its practical reach is wide, because the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to a listed person captures dealings routed through EU financial institutions, and because the ownership-and-control principle extends the freeze to any entity a listed person owns or controls, whether that entity is itself named.


A further measure adopted the same day runs in the opposite direction, easing rather than extending the asset freeze. The Council introduced a temporary derogation for Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Co., Ltd, a Chinese manufacturer of power-discrete semiconductors that had been added to the list in the twentieth package on 23 April 2026 on the basis that its dual-use components had reached Russian military supply chains. Yangjie is a significant supplier of rectifiers, diodes and related power devices to the automotive sector, where they are used in vehicle electrical systems, battery-management modules and electronic control units, as well as EU manufacturers had cautioned that the listing risked exhausting inventories of automotive-grade components within weeks, given that qualification cycles for alternative parts typically run for several months. The measure is a notable acknowledgement that designations reaching deep into globalised component supply chains can carry collateral consequences for EU industry, and that the Council is prepared to calibrate the freeze where an abrupt rupture would fall hardest on EU operators rather than on Russia.

⁴ *Vid.*, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1361, *supra* n. 1; Council of the EU, [EU Sanctions against Russia: Questions and Answers](#).

⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1351 of 15 June 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1356 of 15 June 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.

⁶ Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1363 of 15 June 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/1484, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1362 of 15 June 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1485, concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia; *vid.*, the joint statement of the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands of 16 February 2026 in relation to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

⁷ *Vid.*, Council of the EU, *supra* n. 1; Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP of 23 June 2014 and Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014.



The package also shows how the work is divided between the EU's numbered economic packages and its standing designation regimes. The 20th package of 23 April 2026, amended the sectoral prohibitions and added a substantial tranche of designations; today's action, by contrast, simply adds listings under the existing regimes without touching the sectoral architecture, and the 21st package is still in preparation. Operators tracking the EU's measures should therefore treat the designation lists as something that changes continually between packages, rather than as settled at each numbered package, and should adjust their screening accordingly. The interplay with the parallel UK and US regimes also remains a live concern: the three are closely coordinated, but their lists are not identical, and a counterparty listed by one authority will not necessarily be listed by the others.

How can we help?

Our International Trade & Foreign Investment Practice advises financial institutions, commodity traders, shipping and insurance operators, as well as corporate and sovereign clients on EU, UK and US sanctions, on asset-freeze and designation compliance, on ownership-and-control analysis and on managing cross-border exposure to Russia-related measures. We have deep experience with the EU restrictive-measures framework, with licensing and derogation applications, with counterparty and vessel screening, as well as the contractual and enforcement questions that arise when new designations take effect. If you would like to discuss the implications of this development for your business, whether your concern is counterparty screening, ownership-and-control analysis, contractual review or engagement with the competent authorities, please contact any member of the team listed below.

Contact



José María Viñals

Partner, Madrid, Brussels, Geneva
T +34 91 426 4840
M +34 649 133 822
T +32 2 627 1111
josemaria.vinals@squirepb.com



Diego Sevilla Pascual

Director, Brussels
T +322 627 7612
diego.sevillapascual@squirepb.com



Tigran Piruzyan

Senior Associate, Madrid
T +34 91 520 0772
M +34 618 017 354
tigran.piruzyan@squirepb.com



Jimena Machado

Associate, Madrid
T +34 91 426 4858
jimena.machado@squirepb.com



Ana Morales Torrego

Associate, Madrid
T +34 91 426 2682
ana.morales@squirepb.com